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Abstract. The interactive use of the web between users and service providers 
introduces a privacy problem that involves the undesired disclosing of user 
personal information, mainly with the presence of personalization that needs 
this type of information. Also there are many manners to face it, but the 
Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) is one that provides a variable level of 
privacy for the user’s browsing. However, the P3P only introduces a privacy 
contract between the site and the user, without guarantees that it will be 
obeyed by the site. Then a semantic checker can be added to the P3P 
architecture to compare the contract with the site attitude and to increase the 
trustworthiness on the P3P contract. Some experiments are accomplished and 
the results are displayed to show the present situation of the privacy policies of 
the sites, and we discuss what it implies in the data gathering and what is 
gained with the use of the semantic checker. 
1 Introduction 
The interface implementation in e-commerce applications must consider two aspects: 
the marketing necessities and the user privacy. For both aspects user’s personal data 
has a great worth. On one side, providing competitive advantages in the market 
through the marketing and, on the other hand, presenting a bigger user confidence 
with regard to his disclosed data. This user confidence is recognized as an important 
item to bring to the success of an online marketing, and consequently to increase 
purchases and sales in the web and to improve the e-commerce markets. 
The personalization application is one of the strongest competitive advantages in 
the market. It has become an indispensable instrument to the progress of the services 
and online businesses. The idea of receiving personalized services from visited web 
sites is sufficiently attractive, besides very well accepted by the users. In accordance 
with Kobsa [1], clients need to feel that possess a personal and unique relationship 
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with the enterprises, and to confirm this is presented a research that shows that sites 
offering personalized services achieved an increase of 47% in the number of new 
clients. 
Meanwhile, so that personalization to be applied it is necessary the information 
collection originated in several provenance, which can be gotten explicitly or 
implicitly. 
An individual that sends explicitly information is obviously aware of the sending 
of it. On the other hand, the implicit gathering of information is the resultant data 
acquisition from the user browsing observation, and he can be or not aware of its 
existence. Information obtained by this method contemplates the e-commerce 
interaction data and the clickstream [2] [3] data, which makes possible the creation 
of user profiles based in user interests, browsing patterns, preferences and others.  
But, while the user data gathering can help in the marketing of e-commerce sites, 
it can prejudice the marketing too. Depending on the form that the gathering method 
and analysis process of user data are accomplished it can characterize a privacy 
invasion, whereas the user can loose the control of his personal information [4]. 
This privacy lack results to a user confidence loss, as from this he stops 
accessing certain services fearing that personal information, which has a 
considerable value for him, is disclosed or has a malicious use. This can be 
confirmed by Teltzrow [5] that says 64% of web users haven’t accessed some time a 
web site, or they haven’t bought something from it because they don’t know how 
their information would be used. Also 53% of the users don’t trust in commercial 
web sites that gather data, 66% of them don’t register in online sites fearing that their 
information may be used inappropriately, and 40% of them falsify data when 
registering online [6]. 
Moreover, privacy is considered to be intrinsically related with the control that 
an individual has over determined information [4]. In this way, it must be inherent in 
trustworthy transactions, in another way a privacy lack will contribute to cause a 
fault of the business model of the electronic commerce.  
An increase of the user control perception causes an increase of adoption of 
services and products based on the web. The user control perception is provided by 
bigger information disclosing of the collected data use that is made, and the 
receiving of something worthy in return stimulates the data disclosing by the user. 
Jutla [6] reports that 51% of web users desire to disclose personal data to receive 
something worthy in return and, a research shows that 90% of users want to be asked 
after permission before their information is used or gathered [5]. 
The question is to find an equilibrium point between personal information 
gathering and user privacy. Nevertheless, to find this equilibrium point becomes 
difficult because the privacy is subjective, in this case each one has its privacy 
discernment.  
Several mechanisms utilized to guarantee the user privacy have consequences in 
their access form, producing degrees of reachable personalization. In this way they 
can denigrate the personalized service availableness. 
The 3P Platform, that have been used in a pretty crescent and extensive way [7], 
is interesting to become possible the privacy level modulation in accordance with the 
user preferences, and in this way adapting better to the user characteristics. Also, to 
the use of this platform isn’t necessary to make many modifications, since basically 
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it includes an automatic method of privacy policy reading. Add to that, the privacy 
policies have a big user acceptance, 76% of users think privacy policies are very 
important and 55% of them believe that it turns the personal information disclosing 
more comfortable [5]. 
Notwithstanding, this platform presents a low level of trustworthiness in the 
semantic aspects of the manipulated data. In this manner, it is proposed a semantic 
checker looking at the increment of the trustworthiness degree in the P3P tool. The 
user trustworthiness is incremented by comparing the P3P privacy policies with the 
site’s behavior. Tests are accomplished and their results show that some sites write 
P3P policies correctly, and the inclusion of the checker can obey the other sites to 
improve the construction of their policies.  
This work introduces in the second section several access forms to the user data 
with privacy. In the third section we present the 3P platform mechanisms and its 
limitations. The fourth section presents the Semantic Analyzer. The fifth section 
shows the experiments and results obtained and finally the sixth section describes the 
conclusions and future works.    
2 Privacy Mechanisms 
As manners to face the problem of privacy in the web, many proposals exist that can 
be divided in two basic forms of approach. One of these forms aims at the 
introduction of architectures or mechanisms, tries to keep the anonymity of the user, 
or makes difficult the identification of him. The next mechanisms follow this line of 
approach. 
Cookie crushers or cookie filters are the most common of them. They provide a 
way of controlling or not permitting the cookie existence in the user computer, 
avoiding that personal information can be stored to be recovered subsequently. 
Theoretically cookie [8] is used to store in the user computer the estate of his 
browsing in a determined site. The cookie content is created by web server. The sites 
utilize this information piece to characterize the user profile, gathered through 
analysis methods of browsing as clickstream.  
Clickstream, also known as clickpaths, is the route that the user chooses when he 
clicks or browses by a site. This information is used to determine user profile in his 
browsing.  
The anonymity is wanted by several users that don’t permit that any personal 
information is discovered, thus avoiding any privacy problem and identification of 
the user identity. Three mechanisms are presented as examples of this type of 
approach. Anonymizer [9] is a web proxy that forwards the user requisitions and 
applies certain methods to mask them as requisitions from the proxy. 
Onion Routing [10] is constituted of one or more routers and each one works as a 
proxy that applies certain methods to improve the privacy and to forward randomly 
to the next router or to the destiny site in question. This routers net is built 
dynamically, it is fault tolerant and works to avoid eavesdroppers by making difficult 
to determine the user requisitions source. 
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In Crowds [11], each user contributes hiding the real origin of a requisition, with 
the member co-operation of a group. Randomly and dynamically a requisition can be 
forwarded to a member of a Crowd group or to the site destiny, and it isn’t possible 
to make backtracking search to determine the origin user because each user 
requisition changes the routing process to create a different path.  
Another approach to permit privacy during the user browsing is using 
pseudonyms. It consists basically in to create fictitious names to users to disguise the 
user identity permitting personalization, as soon as web sites are able to determine 
user profiles without link them to the user real identity. An example of this type of 
mechanism is the JPWA (Janus Personalized Web Anonymizer) [12]. It acts as an 
intermediary entity (proxy) between the user and the web site generating 
automatically nicknames when users want to access determined services, executing 
the authentication process. If the real identity of a pseudonym is discovered, all the 
user actions in the past will be automatically exposed.  
Managing Anonymity while Sharing Knowledge to Servers (MASKS) [13] is 
another approach to protect the user privacy permitting personalization based in the 
pseudonyms idea. It hides the user identity under masks or pseudonyms. These 
pseudonyms are associated by some way to a group of similar requisitions. These 
groups are defined in accordance with user interests exhibited during the interaction 
with a web service by making requisitions in name of a group, contrary to an 
individual user, thus not disclosing the user identity. The user requisition is designed 
to a group and not to a user because the requisition represents the user interest in a 
specific moment. The MASKS doesn’t provide privacy when users send explicitly 
their information to sites.  
All the presented mechanisms show some limitations in preserving the privacy or 
permitting personalization. Those mechanisms that protect all the user privacy don’t 
permit personalization, and those that permit personalization have faults to protect 
the user privacy, or they have some problems in the security aspects. 
3 P3P 
Another line of approach introduces the idea to police the sites or to inform the user 
about the privacy policies that are adopted by them, communicating the information 
that is gathered. According to this criterion are presented the following systems. 
One of them is a tool that provides information related to context about privacy and 
personalization options [14]. It is a support system to the user navigation exhibiting a 
situational communication dialogue when the user information is gathered. 
P3P [15][16] inserts a way to manage the user browsing through of a 
standardized method to disclose how the user information is gathered, how they will 
be utilized and the sharing of them to third parts. This management is made through 
the P3P privacy policy checking by a user agent. 
P3P inserts a contract between sites and users, defining a protocol that permits 
the site administrators to publish a site privacy policy. Add to that, a user agent is 
defined by the platform that reads automatically this privacy police, verifying if it 
P3P Semantic Checker of Sit e B ehaviours        45
 
combines with the user privacy preferences or user security configurations, because 
the majority of the users pay attention poorly to the privacy policy readings [5]. 
Web sites are qualified to express their privacy actions by the 3P platform in a 
standard format. This standard format consists in indications made and based in the 
P3P vocabulary to express the privacy behavior of each web site. These indications 
are made by a XML codification with name spaces from P3P vocabulary to provide 
information that defines the site privacy policies, informing which information is 
obtaining and which form is using to obtain it, where and how long the information 
will be stored, who is the responsible and the information gathering purpose. The 
P3P vocabulary é planed to be descriptive of the site behavior, but not to be simply 
an obedience indicator to a particular law or a conduct code.  
The privacy policies of a site must have a reference with their respective and 
specific particularities, permitting to determine the policy range in determined site 
region.  
The policy reference is a codification in XML with name spaces that can specify 
the policy to an entire site, portions of a site or to a unique web document. It also 
links the site parts to its respective policies, shows the exact location of the file that 
contains the P3P privacy policies, defines the access methods to which the policy is 
applicable and the time period to which it claim that is considered to be valid. 
By any means the P3P reference file location must be known to find the file, to 
begin the analysis, and to know the P3P privacy policy location. To his, four 
mechanisms can be used to indicate the policy reference file place: a well known 
location (/w3c/p3p.xml), HTTP headers can be used to point to a policy reference 
file through the creation of a new answer header, a HTML or SHTML link tag can 
be used to obtain the policy reference file. 
The user preferences inform the way how the user agent must act when analyzing 
a privacy policy of a site. 
The user P3P agent works as a tool that acts co-operating with the browser. It can 
be a plug-in added to the browser, a proxy server, or built in the web browsers. 
The user agent looks for a reference of a policy reference file in the HTTP 
header, HTML or SHTMLK link tags and by the well known location. With the 
reference file the agent can obtain the privacy policy respective to the URL the user 
requested and can begin to analyze the policy by comparing it with the user privacy 
preferences. This analysis process results in an indication with symbols, sounds or 
generating alerts to the user. 
P3P Limitations 
According to the P3P specification there is one limitation. It’s argued that the user 
should have control of his privacy instead of to trust completely in privacy policies 
of web sites [13]. Add to that, this is a great problem with the P3P because it can’t 
guarantee sites will act following their policies, considering that P3P is only a 
document describing the privacy policy of a site. 
In this way the site can be obtaining additional data that is specified by the 
privacy policy, and the user doesn’t have guarantees of what information is 
collected. Add to that, this is passed in way that the user doesn’t perceive, whereas 
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he trusts on the signalizing of the user agent that makes the automatic policy 
analysis. 
Laws and auto-regulatory programs that protect the user privacy can be verified 
during the P3P policy assimilation, and, thus imposing certain obedience to the 
policy correctness related to the site. Such laws are only a way to influence web sites 
to be sincere in the building of its policies. However, these laws don’t guarantee that 
every web site will apply it. 
To guarantee that the P3P policies are obeyed is necessary to insert some checker 
that can’t be handled by the sites, it executes a verification of the privacy policy 
faithfulness considering the sites behavior, and returns a guarantee seal. 
4 P3P Semantic Checker 
The Semantic Checker presented in this work objectifies to extend the 3P Platform. 
It adds a bigger trustworthiness to the user browsing by the conference of the privacy 
policy correctness proposed by the 3P platform. The conference of the privacy policy 
correctness is made by inserting a semantic analyzer to the P3P agent user that 
makes a P3P privacy policy checking. This checking is made comparing the site 
behavior with it privacy policy, and this behavior is represented by the site source 
code that comes to the user browser. 
It must be localized in the user computer, trying to increase the security of this 
checker proposed. With this guarantee that the site doesn’t have access to the 
checker and, thus the site can’t corrupt it to produce a false result to the user. If it 
produces a false result it will be deceiving the user, coming back to the original 
situation where there weren’t privacy guarantees. 
After that the user information is collected there isn’t possibility of knowing the 
destiny that will be given to it. Thus, the privacy policy checking with the site 
behavior is only possible at the verification of user data gathering, and without this 
approach only rests the trustworthiness on the privacy policy as the unique way of to 
police the site attitudes with the collected information, or to belief on the law codes 
[16]. 
At the implicit gathering, the information collectors utilize ways that can’t be 
identified by some mechanic analysis method, or they don’t follow a pattern to be 
identified. The cookies can be identified, seeing that they are stored in the user 
computer through a http requisition. However, they aren’t a form of information 
gathering, but a form of storage of information gathered, and their content can’t be 
understood.  
The analysis of explicit gathering is the way that better shows the site behavior at 
the user computer view. This type of gathering can be observed in the html page 
source code that the user accesses. The data requisition, which is made to the users, 
is accomplished by html elements of data entrance. Also, the html code is very used 
to the construction of Web pages, it is generated by the majority of languages of 
dynamic pages as ASP, PHP, JSP and others, and it is embedded in the JavaScript 
code. 
P3P Semantic Checker of Sit e B ehaviours       47
 
To find the places where the user information is obtained is necessary to look for 
by the form tags in the page source code in question. Each data entrance field in each 
form in the site source code represents a data entrance that the user can enter his 
information to be sent to the site, and the set of these input fields results in the 
information set that the user send explicitly to the site. To accomplish the analysis is 
necessary to find each one of these data entrance fields e to compare with the 
respective P3P policy to verify if, through the page, the site is obtaining some 
information over that the policy specifies. 
The checker can be added as a module to the user agent, accomplishing the 
checking every time that the user does a page requisition, which can be visualized by 
the figure 1. In the figure the first communication that is accomplished with the site 
server is to obtain the privacy policy, with it the agent can make the comparison with 
the user preferences. In the second communication the server sends the requested 
page, and the semantic checker accomplishes the analysis with the source code of 
this page and the P3P privacy policy.  
The privacy policy validation can be made before or after that the agent makes 
the comparison between the policy and the user preferences, resulting in an 
additional signalization to the user or even to influence the result that the agent 
signalizes. 
Therefore the semantic checker functioning is made of the following form, 
incorporated at the 3P platform, which can be visualized by the figure 1. 
 
Fig. 1. A Diagram that represents the insertion of the semantic checker to the P3P Platform 
architecture. 
In a page requisition made by the user in his browser (1) in an architecture that 
uses P3P, the user agent intercepts the requisition (2). Initially it looks for (3) (4) a 
P3P privacy policy to analyze the site policies with the user preferences (5). With the 
analysis made, the agent can signalize to the user positively (11), permitting that the 
user can access the page (6) (7) (10) (12), or negatively, letting to the user to take the 
decision in accessing or not the page. 
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The checker makes a semantic analysis with the privacy policy obtained (5) and 
the source code (8). By this analysis is created a signalization that can be 
incorporated to the signalization that the user agent produces (11), or can be refined 
by the agent as an additional criterion in its policy analysis process (9). 
A functioning architecture of semantic checker is presented by the figure 2. At it, 
three entrances can be identified, html source code file and the respective URL (1), 
privacy policy reference file (2) and P3P privacy policy file (3). 
 
Fig. 2. Semantic Checker Architecture and functioning – through the html source code 
analysis of the site and of its privacy policy is generated a result to the policy approbation. 
By the entrances at the figure 2 will be begun the policy analysis by the 
Analyzer. First is necessary to find the respective page privacy policy according to 
its URL (4), to this is utilized a lexicon analyzer to recognize the reference file 
elements (5). At the end of this process it is returned the policy name that must be 
used. 
Determined the respective policy, the data entrance elements are obtained, which 
are identified by the input fields (6). Also it is used the lexicon analyzer to recognize 
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the html elements and to be able to found them (7). The privacy policy data elements 
also will be obtained (8) using a lexicon analyzer to identify them by the data fields. 
Obtained the both elements, is accomplished a comparison of each input field of 
the html source code with the privacy policy elements to investigate is the field is 
specified by the policy (10). Depending on this comparison made, a negative or 
positive result can be returned (11). 
The figure 3 presents a sequence diagram of a user’s page requisition. The sixth 
arrow represents the semantic checker action added to the P3P, and the others arrows 
represent the user requisitions and the P3P answers without the checker functioning 
inclusion.  
Add to that, each information entrance field needs to be delimited by the site 
privacy policy, and the fields of data entrance in the site source code needs to have 
some binding with the respective elements of its P3P specification, which in the case 
of this initial implementation, the link is the html field to have a name equals to the 
P3P policy specification. 
 
Fig. 3. Sequence diagram of an example of semantic checker execution in a page requisition.  
However, this proposed link between names restrings the page construction. But, 
the proposal suggested is initial and utilized more to test. A proposal more suitable is 
to create an attribution file together with the P3P policy to be utilized to accomplish 
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the verification of the input fields. This additional brings flexibility to the owners of 
the sites at the creation of entrance fields. 
5 Experiments and Results 
The experiments are accomplished trying to present a situation of how the sites and 
their respective P3P privacy policies are.  
The research consisted in to make a process closed to the mechanism of the 
semantic checker, obtaining each source code of each page and its respective privacy 
policy. It was made a comparison between the data element names of the policy and 
the input element names of the page, signalizing if some element wasn’t delimited by 
the policy. 
The result of the automatic analysis was the same as the result that was hoped, no 
one page that had text entrance elements and was analyzed passed by the verification 
with positive signalization, whereas the analysis is based in the comparison of 
names. 
But, in a manual analysis of the gathered data some evidences could be observed. 
This manual analysis consists in to observe the input elements obtained with their 
respective data elements. In this observation was approached also the comparison 
between the name means of the gathered input fields and the means of the data 
elements obtained, and thus to try understand how was constructed the privacy 
policy and the site page to relate them in some way. 
Initially were accessed 100 compliant sites with the 3P Platform. The addresses 
of these sites were obtained from a listing in http://www.w3.org/P3P/compliant_site. 
In a sampling of 100 sites only 57 could be analyzed, the others 43 had some 
problem that made impossible their access or the use of their P3P privacy policy: the 
site was in construction, it wasn’t found, the access was forbidden, there were 
problems in the syntactic construction of the P3P policies, the policies weren’t found 
or the policy reference files weren’t found, seeing that the reference file was looked 
for in the well known location. 
With these 57 correct sites 120 pages were obtained so that their html source 
codes were analyzed. By the analysis, 33 pages of 120 didn’t have any input element 
of data entrance, and thus they weren’t utilized to the verification. Therefore, with a 
sampling of 87 pages was obtained the following graphic presented in figure 4. 
The research only approaches the explicit information gathering, the dynamic 
data specification [16] wasn’t considered, as dynamic.http, dynamic.clickstream or 
dynamic.cookies. The cookie content doesn’t follow a construction pattern: each site 
builds it in a different way, needing knowledge of all site behavior and source code 
to predict its value. 
The 87 pages were classified in six categories, in accordance with how they 
presented their privacy policies, and each category represents a percentage of the 87 
pages. 
The “A” category delimits the pages that have a P3P privacy police and doesn’t 
describe any one of their input fields of their html source codes.  
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The “B” category delimits the pages that have policies specified in a generic way 
all or a big part of their input fields. It describes only what is made with any data that 
is collected by the page, or also it can be a generic specification as user.business-info 
or user.home-info. 
The “C” category delimits the pages that have a privacy policy that specifies 
each input element of the form in their html codes.  
The “D” category delimits the pages that have privacy policy that specifies only 
some input fields of the source code. 
The “E” category delimits the pages that have names of input fields in the html 
code that their meaning can’t be understood or they have a very generic meaning, as 
loesung1, sp-q or word. 
The “F” category delimits the pages that have some input field names in the html 
code that can be understood and they are specified by the privacy policy. 
 
Fig. 4. Graphic that presents the experiment results classified in categories of P3P privacy 
policy situation. 
Also it was observed that the majority of the pages, close to the totality, specified 
the dynamic data gathering. Even to those policies that informed nothing to the 
explicit data gathering. This evidences that the P3P compliant sites are aware in 
specify the implicit information gathering, but they specify poorly the input fields at 
html source code.  
Therefore, in general terms can be concluded that 44.82 percent of the pages, 
almost half of the pages that utilize the 3P platform specify with more details in 
majority of their fields of explicit information gathering. This shows that the 
mechanism can be used as a tool to improve the user trustworthiness by verifying. 
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6 Conclusions 
Among all the experiment results made, it can be observed that the totality of the 
sites compliant with the P3P policy don’t satisfy the restrictions to the execution of 
the checker. It was also observed that more than half of the sampling of these 100 
sites complaints with the 3P platform don’t look for to specify in detail the data that 
is obtain from the users. 
The insertion of this checker in the 3P platform increases the user trustworthiness 
guaranteeing that all the data that is gathered explicitly is specified by the P3P 
privacy policy. The checker would be an additional reinforcement to the sites that 
use P3P and detail their specification of data gathering, and would force the others to 
detail the elements of the information gathered. Thus, over increasing the 
trustworthiness in the privacy policies, also would improve the construction of the 
P3P policies, with more details in the site specifications. 
The next step is to improve the process of checking by retiring the restriction that 
each html entrance field must have the same name as in its respective P3P privacy 
policy, this can be made by using a file stored together with the privacy policy that 
makes the linking between the names, as suggested before.  
As evidenced, this proposal considers the explicit data gathering, which is 
analyzed in the site source code. However a cookie analysis can be added to the 
checking process, the cookie presence is identified by the HTTP communication, but 
its content can’t be understood or analyzed. 
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